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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) because this matter is a criminal appeal from the Third District 
Court, a court of record, and does not involve a charge of a first degree 
felony or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Whether defendants request for counsel for the breath test was an 
invocation of counsel that merits the protection of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966), Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and their 
progeny. 
If this Court rules that defendants request for counsel for the breath 
test merited such protection, whether the trial court's failure to suppress 
defendant's post-Miranda statements resulted in prejudicial error. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard for this Court's review of the trial court's factual findings 
that support the trial court's decision to deny the defendant's motion to 
suppress is the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 
1186 (Utah 1995), citing State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1992). 
Clear error will be found only if this Court decides that the factual findings 
1 
were not supported by the record. Id. citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
935-36 (Utah 1994). 
This Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, 
Trover, 910 P.2d at 1186. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The City is satisfied with defendant's Statement of the Case and 
therefore does not submit its own Statement of the Case. See Rule 24(b)(1) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I: The trial court correctly ruled that defendant's request for 
counsel for the breath test did not merit the protections of Miranda, 
Edwards, and their progeny. First, the trial court correctly found that 
defendant was asking for an attorney to help defendant determine whether to 
take the breath test. Second, defendant did not ask for an attorney to act as 
an intermediary between himself and Officer Falkner in a custodial 
interrogation situation. Third, under Utah's Implied Consent Law defendant 
has no right to counsel when deciding whether to take the breath test. 
Fourth, Officer Falkner clearly explained to defendant that defendant had no 
right to an attorney as the Utah Implied Consent Law requires. Fifth, if 
defendant ambiguously invoked his right to counsel, then Officer Falkner 
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clarified defendant's request and defendant's rights. Defendant then 
intelligently and knowingly waived his right to counsel. 
POINT II: If this Court holds that there was an evidentiary error and 
the admission of defendant's post-Miranda statements was an error, then that 
error was not prejudicial to defendant. The statements were limited and not 
important to the City's case as the statements mitigated defendant's pre-arrest 
statement that he had drunk a six pack. Further, by chronologically putting 
the last of defendant's four beers at 11:30 p.m., one and one-half hours 
before the crash, the post-Miranda statements further mitigated defendant's 
pre-arrest statement regarding the six pack. In addition to the limited nature 
of the post-Miranda statements and their lack of importance to the City's 
case, the City had a strong case and defendant's Post-Miranda statements 
were cumulative. Looking at the impact of the post-Miranda statements on 
the jury it is clear the statements were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
and not prejudicial to defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS BEFORE JUDGE DEVER WHEN HE 
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
On April 21, 2005, the City and defendant appeared before Judge 
Dever and argued their motions. No witnesses were called. Defense 
counsel states during his argument, "I believe that the City would stipulate to 
the facts which I have taken straight from the police report". (R. 136:4). 
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Although the City did not state on the record that it stipulated to the facts 
that defendant took from the police report, City did state "[w]e!re generally 
going to submit on the brief1. (R. 136:7). In his trial motion and 
memorandum to suppress, defendant accurately quotes the responding 
officer's narrative as follows: "At first he agreed to take the test but would 
not blow into the tube. He then requested council [sic] before taking the 
test. I explained to him over and over that he did not have a right to council 
[sic] for the test and told him that he would be refusing the test if he did not 
do as instructed. He refused the test." (R. 37). 
Both the City and the defendant stated in their memoranda for the 
suppression hearing that after defendant refused the breath test, Officer 
Falkner read defendant his Miranda rights. Defendant indicated that he 
understood his right to counsel and agreed to speak with Officer Falkner. 
(R. 37, 44). 
Post-Miranda defendant told Officer Falkner the following: defendant 
"indicated that he had been drinking at a club and that he had consumed f6 
beers, 4 beers (2 bottles 2 cans)[sic]\ He also indicated that his first drink 
was at 8:00 and his last drink was at 11:30." (R. 37). 
In response to defendant's oral argument, Judge Dever questioned 
defense counsel as follows: "Wait, wait. The right that he [defendant] 
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I s i i f t 1:1 l a t \ < ' 1: l a t I: lie said ] Isi i't tl lat tl I =; statei i lei it 1 le i i lade*: " (1R 13 6:6). 
Defense counsel responded: " v v 1 lat the officer says in the report is that he 
[defendant] requested counsel before taking the test. 7 explained to him 
o\ er and over that he did not have the right to counsel \v- ihc test, ana -
M i l l ! t i l i l i l i ^ » \ l ' u i u i -\. i v - i U S U i g . 
i belic\ e iiie Court has basically argued what the City was 
going to argue. He [defendant] did not unambiguously invoke 
his right to counsel. He specifically qualified his right to 
counsel relative to the test. The officer appropriately read him 
his Miranda rights because he was dealing with going 1*-
question him, and at that time the defendant then, after being 
read his Miranda rights, said he understood his rights and 
answered questions. 
) . 
Judge I > * : ] :r iniite entry ruling/motion hearing stating as 
follows: "Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. Court finds argumei.N 
from the City are persuasive and defendant's 1st request applied to cour^ 1 
for the breath test. W m.u MmiuJa was given to me ueieuuant he was \ ,. ;. 
ID and IIJUIII (HHI1, HII IIIIDIIM HIDII "'" 1U k>N) 
• ^ urnr- J - . I*' ui ' P l v v vtmiliied 
Judge Dever's ruling. (R, 77; 137:3-4). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS FROM TRIAL 
On October 17, 2004 at approximately 1:00 a.m. defendant drove his 
extended cab pick-up truck southbound on West Temple approaching 600 
South. Defendant drove "very fast" through his red light and "T-boned" a 
sedan that was driving through on its green light on 600 South at West 
Temple, injuring the sedan driver who was placed on a stretcher and 
transported by ambulance to a hospital. (R. 138:14-15). Defendant did not 
swerve or slow before hitting the sedan. (R. 138:15). Two eyewitnesses 
saw defendant run the light. (R. 138:21). The light had been green for the 
sedan driver for approximately "thirty, forty-five seconds" when defendant 
hither. (R. 138:158). 
Defendant hit the driver's side of the sedan as it entered the 
intersection. (R. 138:15 and 120). 
A third party witness, Ana Crowe, was driving approximately 20 feet 
behind the sedan and testified as to the facts surrounding the crash described 
above (R. 138:14). At trial, defendant testified that an animal ran in front of 
his truck and defendant looked in his rearview mirror to see if he had run 
over it. He testified that he looked forward again and for three to four 
seconds before the crash his light was green. (R. 138:119). At the crash 
6 
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Defendant's front bumper was ripped almost entirely off and was 
resting on the grass and curb when officers arrived. (See plaintiffs exhibit 1 
photographs and Is m. •! .UH US Iront passenger tire nad . iown and 
... luiwK wii. .L..;.,., plaii itiffs e::: ::! libit 1 p I: lotograpl is ai id R. 
71 ai id 72) ,'"" 11 fi - • :!• • • l i I :ic • /s • :: i I the i Igl it side of the extended cab pick i lp 
truck were smashed from the force of the impact. (See plaintiffs exhibit 1 
photographs and R 122) 
There was extensive damage to the front drivei 's aic oi me sedan. 
L bumper wa.> i, iug partial]) w.i me ground ,^ > •„ ; i 
i • » i • » ( • l .. . ' ' was 
. - i .-.*•! K" clerical. (R. 138:10). The injured sedan driver was put on a 
stretcher, loaded into an ambulance, and taken to the lu-.pital. (R. 1 ^S:6~). 
^ fondant never crossed the street to check on the sedan driver (R 
138:132). 
1 1 le ii: i lpact • :>f defer idai itfs pick i lp • t i i id : s 3i it tl le S' sdai I si :iddii lg ii it : > 
tl le Sh lclaii Parking lot at the soi ithwest corner of 600 South and West 
Temple . (R. 138.15 and 120). Hie force of the impact sent defendant's 
pick-up truck up m er the curb onto the grass and over a sign at the no*th< ?->t 
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corner of 600 South and West Temple. (R. 138:139). The impact turned 
both vehicles 90 degrees: it turned the sedan to its right and the extended-
cab pick-up truck to its left. (R. 138:120). The vehicles finally came to a 
rest where they are depicted in plaintiffs "exhibit 1" photographs (See 
plaintiffs exhibit 1 and R. 138:119). 
Officer Mark Falkner was dispatched to the accident. As Officer 
Falkner approached defendant, at approximately five feet away, he could 
smell alcohol on defendant. Officer Falkner could also smell alcohol on 
defendant's breath. (R. 138:19). Officer Falkner saw that defendant had 
watery, red bloodshot eyes. Officer Falkner also heard defendant's slurred 
speech. (R. 138:20). 
Officer Falkner asked defendant how much he had to drink. 
Defendant responded that he had drunk a six pack. (R. 138:20). Officer 
Falkner asked defendant if defendant's light was red or green. Defendant 
responded "I'm not sure. As far as I know it was green." (R. 138:21). 
Officer Falkner asked defendant to perform field sobriety tests 
("FSTs"). Officer Falkner's DUI experience includes nine years as a patrol 
officer with the Salt Lake City Police Department. In that time Officer 
Falkner conducted approximately 100 DUI investigations. (R. 138:19-20). 
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Officer Falkner received his NHTSA (National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration) training at POST (Police Officers Standards 
Training) (R. 138:26). Officer Falkner participated in alcohol studies at 
POST as both a volunteer drinker and as a participant receiving training. 
Officer Falkner has observed a correlation at his POST training between 
how subjects performed on the FSTs and their blood or breath alcohol level. 
At his POST training Officer Falkner was able to closely estimate the 
subject's blood or breath alcohol level based on his performance on the 
FSTs. (R. 138:27). Later, based on Officer Falkner's training and 
experience and his observations of defendant, Officer Falkner determined 
that defendant was too impaired by alcohol to safely drive and arrested him. 
(R. 138:37). 
The first FST was the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test where 
the officer requests that the subject follow a stimulus and looks for an 
involuntary jerking of the eye, or nystagmus. Defendant's eyes exhibited 
nystagmus on each test. Defendant failed that test. (R. 138:26). 
Dr. Robert Rothefeder, an emergency physician, testified for the 
defense. Dr. Rothefeder testified that alcohol is one of a number of 
possibilities that would cause nystagmus. (R. 138:93). He also testified that 
the testing he performs in a medical setting is not the same as NHTSA 
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except for the nystagmus at maximum deviation. (R. 138:91). Dr. 
Rothefeder testified that a closed head injury or a concussion could cause 
HGN. (R. 138:93-94). 
Defendant spoke to Dr. Rothefeder for the first time after Dr. 
Rothefeder's testimony and before defendant's testimony. (R. 138:144-145). 
After speaking with Dr. Rothefeder for the first time during trial and hearing 
Dr. Rothefeder's testimony, defendant testified that he had a closed head 
injury and that he hit his head on the driver's side door frame when he 
crashed into the sedan. (R. 138:145, 120). Defendant, however, did not tell 
anyone at the crash site that he had a closed head injury and that his head 
hurt. (R. 138: 133-134). In fact, he was examined by an Emergency Medical 
Technician (EMT) on site. In response to medical questions from the EMT 
defendant failed to mention that his head hurt as a result of the accident or 
that his head had hit his door frame. (R. 138:133-134). When asked if he 
had told anyone at the crash site that his head hurt, defendant responded "I 
didn't say anything to anybody." (R. 138:134). When further questioned 
"even when directly asked several times?" Defendant responded "right". (R. 
138:134). Defendant did remember to tell a sergeant on scene that 
defendant had once had tuberculosis. (R. 138:131). 
10 
Officer Falkner asked defendant if he had any physical problems. 
Defendant answered that he had an ankle injury in 1997 which was seven 
years prior to the accident (R. 138:23). When questioned by his attorney 
regarding his ankle injury, the walk and turn test, and the one legged stand 
defendant stated "I just did the best that I could11. (R. 138:125) Defendant 
never stated that his ankle injury prevented him from performing these two 
tests properly. On cross-examination, defendant testified that his ankle 
injury did permit him to work at a laboratory at the time of the crash and to 
spend eight hours a day on his feet. (R. 138:142) 
The next FST that defendant performed was the nine step walk and 
turn. (R. 138:30-33). Defendant did not perform the test as instructed. 
Defendant stepped off the line, there was a gap between his heel and toe, and 
he spun around rather than pivoting as instructed. In addition to these clues, 
defendant was uncertain, shaky, and wobbly on his feet. Defendant failed 
the test (R. 138:30-33,37,50). 
The final FST was the one legged stand. Defendant was able to 
follow most of the instructions given to him except that he waived his arms 
and they came out farther than six inches from his body. (R. 138:34). 
Significantly, however, defendant was unable to count to thirty. He counted 
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21- 1,000 then 13 - 1,000 and then paused, and continued with 21- 1,000. 
(R. 138:35). 
Officer Falkner testified that he personally had undergone knee 
surgery and had a permanent partial disability on his leg. Further, he 
testified that he carries 35 pounds of equipment while on patrol. Officer 
Falkner testified that he is capable of performing the FSTs even with his 
physical limitation and with his heavy equipment on. (R. 138:35-36). 
After the FSTs, Officer Falkner determined that defendant was 
impaired by alcohol and unable to safely drive his vehicle and arrested 
defendant based on the following factors: defendant ran a red light and hit a 
car, defendant smelled strongly of alcohol, he had red bloodshot eyes, 
slurred speech, his performance on the field sobriety tests, and his inability 
to count to thirty. (R. 138:37). Defendant blew on the portable breath test 
and the results were positive for alcohol. (R. 138:54) 
Officer Falkner took defendant to the police station to take the breath 
test. At the station, Officer Falkner told defendant that he needed to blow 
hard into the machine. Defendant was not blowing hard into the machine. 
In response to defendant's next attempt, Officer Falkner told defendant 
"You're not even blowing into this thing. You need to blow hard, and if you 
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don't do it, it's going to come up and it's going to print out that there was no 
sample—insufficient sample. . . You need to blow hard." (R. 138:39). 
Officer Falkner explained to defendant if he was blowing hard enough 
the machine would make a tone. The machine was not making any tone. 
Officer Falkner testified that he has observed other people failing to blow 
hard enough into the machine, hoping that the machine will not get an 
accurate result. (R. 138:39). 
Defendant then asked Officer Falkner "Do I need a lawyer?" Officer 
Falkner responded "Well, that's up to you. It's not up to me, it's up to you." 
(R: 138:39). Defendant responded "Well, I think I want my lawyer here 
before I take this test." (R. 138:39). 
Officer Falkner gave the following admonition regarding refusal to 
take the test: "If you refuse to take - refuse the test or fail to follow my 
instructions the test will not be given. However, I must warn you, your 
driving privileges may be revoked for one year for a first refusal. . . Unless 
you immediately request the test, the test can not be given." (R. 138:40). 
After this admonition was read defendant responded "[w]ell I think I want 
my lawyer here with me", (R. 138:40). 
Officer Falkner then read defendant the admonition regarding right to 
counsel and the chemical test. "Your right to remain silent and your right to 
13 
counsel do not apply to the implied - sorry, implied consent law, which is 
civil in nature and separate from your criminal charges. Your right to 
remain silent does not give you the right to refuse to take the test. You do 
not have the right to have counsel during the test procedure. Unless you 
submit to the test I'm requesting, I'll consider that you have refused to take 
the test. I'll warn you if you refuse to take the test your driver's license can 
be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited license." (R. 138:40-
41). 
Officer Falkner read the previous admonition several times. 
Defendant claimed he wasn't refusing to take the test. Officer Falkner 
responded that "if you don't blow into the machine that is a refusal." (R. 
138:41). Officer Falkner repeated his explanation many times. Officer 
Falkner also told defendant "You do not have the right to have a lawyer here 
for this test, and if you don't take it that is a refusal." Defendant responded 
"I'm not refusing." Officer Falkner responded "No, by definition that is a 
refusal. It says right here if you do not do this it's a refusal." (R. 138:41). 
The discussion between Officer Falkner and defendant regarding 
defendant's refusal to blow and his request to have an attorney before he 
blew into the breath test lasted for approximately 20 minutes. (R. 138:54). 
Ultimately, Officer Falkner determined that defendant was refusing to take 
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the breath test and marked it as a refusal on his DUI report form. (R. 138:39, 
41,55). 
Officer Falkner gave defendant his Miranda rights from the pre-
printed DUI form which included defendant's right to remain silent and his 
right to have counsel with him while he was being questioned. (R. 138:42) 
(Miranda at 469). Defendant indicated that he understood his rights and he 
agreed to talk to Officer Falkner. (R. 138:42). Defendant told Officer 
Falkner that defendant had six beers. Then he told Officer Falkner that he 
had four beers, "two bottles and two cans". (R. 138:43). Defendant told 
Officer Falkner that he had drunk his first beer at 8:00 p.m. and his last drink 
at 11:30 p.m. (R. 138:43). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR COUNSEL FOR THE BREATH TEST WAS NOT 
AN INVOCATION OF COUNSEL MERITING PROTECTION 
UNDER MIRANDA, EDWARDS AND THEIR PROGENY. 
Judge Deverfs minute entry states "Defendant's Motion to Suppress is 
denied. Court finds arguments from the City are persuasive and defendant's 
1st request applied to counsel for the breath test. When Miranda was given 
to the defendant he was willing to and did provide information." (R. 58). 
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A. THE TRIAL COURT MADE A CORRECT FACTUAL 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT REQUESTED COUNSEL 
FOR THE BREATH TEST: THEREFORE, THE NARROW 
ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT IS WHETHER 
DEFENDANTS REQUEST MERITS THE PROTECTION OF 
MIRANDA, EDWARDS AND THEIR PROGENY. 
Judge Dever made a factual finding, supported by the record, that 
defendant requested counsel for the breath test. Therefore, the remaining 
issue before this Court is whether such a request merits the protection of 
Miranda, Edwards, and their progeny. The portion of the minute entry that 
states "defendant's 1st request applied to counsel for the breath test" is a 
factual finding supported by the record which includes the parties' briefs. As 
defendant said "I believe that the City would stipulate to the facts which I 
have taken straight from the police report". (R. 136:4). Later in the hearing, 
the City responds "[w]e're generally going to submit on the brief1 (R. 136:7) 
and the City on appeal concedes it stipulated to the facts in Officer Falkner's 
police report for the suppression hearing. Defendant's brief contains Officer 
Falkner's police report narrative: "He then requested council [sic] before 
taking the test. I explained to him over and over that he did not have a right 
to council [sic] for the test and told him that he would be refusing the test if 
he did not do as instructed. He refused the test." (R. 37). 
Thus, Judge Dever correctly found by the preponderance of the 
evidence that defendant was asking for counsel for the purpose of taking the 
16 
breath test. See U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (holding burden of 
proof for suppression hearings is preponderance of the evidence). See also, 
State v. Rynhait 125 P.3d 938; (Utah 2005) (holding that burden of proof 
for prosecution in Fourth Amendment abandonment of expectation of 
privacy at a suppression hearing is preponderance of the evidence). 
Although it is clear from both the suppression hearing record and the 
trial record that defendant asked for counsel for the breath test, the record at 
the suppression hearing is sufficient. (R. 37, 138:39-42, 54). Both the trial 
record and the suppression hearing record are clear that defendant requested 
counsel for the purpose of taking the breath test. Defendant, however, relies 
on the trial record for his argument. At the beginning of trial defendant re-
asserted his motion to suppress that is the subject of defendant's appeal. (R. 
138:3-4). At the end of trial, however, defendant did not renew his motion 
to suppress to indicate that new evidence has been put on the record that 
supported his motion to suppress. (State v. Robinson et al, 797 P.2d 431 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding that record of suppression hearing sufficient 
to determine on undisputed facts whether the State met its burden on Fifth 
Amendment voluntariness issue.) 
The suppression hearing record is sufficient and clearly supports 
Judge Dever's factual finding that defendant requested counsel only for the 
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breath test. The only remaining issue, therefore, is whether a request for 
counsel for the breath test merits the protection of Miranda, Edwards, and 
their progeny. This issue is discussed below. 
B. MIRANDA, EDWARDS, AND THEIR PROGENY 
PROTECT DEFENDANTS WHO ASK FOR COUNSEL TO 
ACT AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN POLICE AND 
DEFENDANT AND ATTACHES ONLY TO CUSTODIAL 
INTERROGATION: DEFENDANT DID NOT INVOKE HIS 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE DISCUSSION 
REGARDING THE BREATH TEST WAS NOT A 
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION. 
The holdings of Miranda, Edwards and their progeny protect 
defendants who ask for counsel to act as an intermediary between police and 
themselves. This right to counsel attaches only to a custodial interrogation. 
Defendant was not asking for counsel to act as an intermediary between the 
police and himself. Defendant wanted to consult with counsel to determine 
if he should take the breath test. (R. 138:39, 40). Further, the discussion 
between the officer and defendant regarding the breath test was not a 
custodial interrogation. The discussion below addresses Miranda's progeny 
cases that defendant cited as support for his position that defendant invoked 
his right to counsel. 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) clearly states that a 
defendant must ask for counsel to act as an intermediary between himself 
and police. The Supreme Court held that "an accused, such as Edwards, 
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having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is 
not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been 
made available to himM. Id. at 484. (Emphasis added.) 
Edwards was in custody on burglary and murder charges when he was 
read Miranda and submitted to questioning. Edwards was told that he was 
implicated by another in the crime. Edwards provided a taped alibi defense 
and then told police he wanted to make a deal. Sometime later Edwards 
said "I want an attorney before making a deal." Id. at 479. 
An attorney was not provided to Edwards. Detectives arrived the 
next morning to talk with Edwards. The detention officer told Edwards that 
he "had to" speak with the detectives. The detectives identified themselves 
and informed Edwards of his Miranda rights. Id. Edwards later implicated 
himself in the crime. Id at 478-479. 
In Edwards, a defendant told police he "wanted an attorney before 
making a deal": he invoked his constitutional right to an attorney to act as 
an intermediary between him and police. Then law enforcement told 
defendant that he "had to" speak with detectives. Id. at 479. Telling 
defendant he "had to" speak with detectives was inaccurate. After receiving 
Miranda warnings, defendant gave an incriminating statement. 
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The facts in Edwards differ significantly from the instant case. 
Defendant asked for an attorney to help him decide whether to take the 
breath test. He did not ask to have an attorney act as an intermediary 
between himself and police. Officer Falkner told defendant accurately that 
defendant had no right to confer with an attorney regarding the breath test. 
(See discussion below.) 
In Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990), another case cited by 
defendant to support his position, defendant clearly indicated he wanted to 
have an attorney act as an intermediary between police and himself. 
Defendant told police to lf[c]ome back Monday when I have a lawyer". 
Minnick, 498 U.S. at 148. Again, like in Edwards, police inaccurately told 
Minnick that he had to speak with law enforcement and could not refuse. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that once counsel is requested, interrogation 
must stop and cannot re-start until defendant has counsel present. Id. at 153. 
The difference between Minnick and the instant case is that defendant said 
he wanted an attorney to determine if he was going to take the breath test. 
(R. 37). Defendant was invoking a right he did not have and Officer Falkner 
gave him correct information on Utah's Implied Consent Law. (R. 37; R. 
138:39-42,54). 
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In McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991), another case cited 
by defendant, in a discussion of the difference between right to counsel 
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the U.S. Supreme Court held "the 
likelihood that a suspect would wish counsel to be present is not the test for 
the applicability of Edwards." The rule of that case applies only when the 
suspect: 
"has expressed his wish" for the particular sort of lawyerly 
assistance that is the subject of Miranda . . . It requires, at a 
minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to 
be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in 
dealing with custodial interrogation by the police. 
Id. citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. Again, in the instant case, defendant 
did not "express[] his wish for the particular sort of lawyerly assistance that 
is the subject of Miranda" and he did not make a statement that could be 
"reasonably [] construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of 
an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police." Id. 
The defendant also cites U.S. v. Kelsey, 951 F.2d 1196 (10TH Cir. 
1991), to support his claim that he invoked his right to counsel during the 
breath test discussion. The important difference between Kelsey and the 
instant case is what the defendant in Kelsey asked for and how the police 
responded. In Kelsey, members of a police narcotics strike force were 
searching Kelseyfs home when Kelsey arrived. The police searched Kelsey, 
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found drugs on him and put him under arrest. Kelsey was handcuffed and 
put on a couch while police continued to search. Three or four times Kelsey 
clearly asked to see his lawyer. The police responded if they allowed 
Kelsey to see his lawyer now they could not ask him any more questions and 
would have to take Kelsey to jail. Eventually, one of the officers asked 
Kelsey if he wanted to talk to the police. Kelsey agreed. At some point 
during the interrogation the officer gave Kelsey Miranda warnings. Kelsey 
gave an incriminating statement, 951 F.2d at 1198. 
The Tenth Circuit found that the comments of the police to Kelsey 
were important to the Miranda analysis: 
It is clear from the exchange between Kelsey and the police 
described above that the police intended to question Kelsey at 
some point at his home, and that the police understood Kelsey 
to be invoking his right to counsel during questioning. 
Recognizing the import of Kelsey's request, the police stated 
that if they allowed him to see his lawyer they could not 
question him further. We thus conclude that Kelsey's request 
for counsel was sufficient to bring this case within the ambit of 
Edwards. 
Id. at 1199. 
In Kelsey the defendant clearly asked for an attorney to act as an 
intermediary between himself and the police. The police clearly indicated 
that they understood that defendant had asked for an attorney by saying if he 
got his attorney the police could not speak with defendant further. In the 
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instant case, defendant did not ask for an attorney to act as an intermediary 
between himself and the police. Defendant asked for an attorney to help him 
decide whether to take the breath test. Defendant did not invoke his right to 
an attorney. (R. 37) 
The differences between the facts of the cases cited by defendant and 
the instant case are critical. In the instant case defendant asked for an 
attorney to help him decide whether to take the breath test. He did not say "I 
want an attorney before making a deal", Edwards, 451 U.S. at 479; or to 
"[c]ome back on Monday when I have a lawyer11, Minnick, 498 U.S. at 148. 
Unlike Kelsey, defendant did not ask clearly to see his attorney three or four 
times while sitting handcuffed on his couch watching police search his house 
for drugs after finding drugs on him, Kelsey, 951 F.2d at 1199. Unlike 
Edwards, defendant does not ,fexpress[] his desire to deal with the police 
only through counsel", Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. Neither does defendant 
express his "desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial 
interrogation by the police", McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178. 
Another important difference between the instant case and the cases 
cited by defendant is the accuracy of statements made by law enforcement to 
defendants. In contrast to the inaccurate statements made by law 
enforcement to defendants in the cases discussed above, Officer Falkner's 
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statements were appropriate to ensure defendant understood his situation as 
a refusal to take the breath test. (See discussion below.) Officer Falkner 
was not trying to deceive defendant in order to obtain a confession. 
Defendant makes a one paragraph reference to a "coercive atmosphere 
discussed in Miranda" that was allegedly present in the instant case. (See 
Appellant's brief 17.) In Kelsey, the Court describes "precisely the type of 
coercive atmosphere that generates the need for application of the Edwards 
rule" as follows: 
Kelsey came home to find his house being searched by a police strike force, 
including masked officers. He was arrested and handcuffed along with there 
women whom he described as shaking and upset. His requests for an 
attorney were met with the option of being taken to jail and with offers of 
easier treatment if he cooperated and talked with the police. After holding 
Kelsey for some period of time without allowing him to talk to his lawyer, 
the police initiated uncounselled discussion with him. Kelsey agreed on the 
condition that the three women being held would be released. Under 
Edwards, these circumstances require that the resulting incriminating 
statements be suppress. 
Kelsey, 951 F.2d at 1199.There is no coercive atmosphere in Officer 
Falkner's patient explanation of defendant's rights and responsibilities under 
the Implied Consent Law. (See discussion below.) 
Finally, Officer Falkner and defendant's discussion regarding the 
breath test was not a "custodial interrogation" like the cases cited by 
defendant: it was merely an explanation of defendant's rights. "The Fifth 
Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present 
24 
at any custodial interrogation. Absent such interrogation, there would have 
been no infringement of the right that Edwards invoked and there would be 
no occasion to determine is there had been a valid waiver.1' Edwards, 451 
U.S. at 485-486. "'Interrogation,' as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, 
must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in 
custody itself" Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (holding 
that two officers discussing in the presence of the defendant the search for a 
missing shotgun and their hope that a handicapped child would not find it 
before police did was not a custodial interrogation). 
Defendant was not being interrogated during the breath test 
discussion. This is clear from the suppression hearing record, "[defendant 
requested council [sic] before taking the test" and from the trial record, if 
this Court decides to consider the trial record. (R.37). At trial, Officer 
Falkner testified that he said "Unless you immediately request the test, the 
test can not be given." Defendant responded: "Well I think I want my 
lawyer here with me." (R. 138:40). Defendant then asked Officer Falkner 
"Do I need a lawyer?" Officer Falkner responded: "Well, that's up to you. 
It's not up to me, it's up to you." (R: 138:39). Defendant responded "Well, I 
think I want my lawyer here before I take this test." (R. 138:39). I want to 
call an attorney to see if I should take this test or not." (R. 138:54). There is 
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no compulsion here "above and beyond that inherent in custody itself." 
Innis, 446 U.S. at 300. 
Defendant's request for counsel for the breath test did not invoke the 
protection of Miranda, Edwards and their progeny. Defendant wanted 
counsel to help defendant determine whether he should take the breath test. 
Defendant did not ask for counsel to act as an intermediary between himself 
and Officer Falkner. In addition, Officer Falkner made accurate statements 
of the law unlike law enforcement officers in cases cited by defendant. 
Finally, Officer Falkner and defendant's discussion regarding the breath test 
was not a custodial interrogation and thus defendant's request was not an 
invocation of counsel. 
C. UNDER UTAH'S IMPLIED CONSENT LAW AN 
ARRESTED DRIVER DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL TO HELP HIM DECIDE WHETHER TO TAKE 
THE CHEMICAL TEST: DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED TO 
INVOKE A RIGHT HE DID NOT POSSESS. 
Utah's Implied Consent Law is clear that defendant had no right to an 
attorney to help him decide whether to take the chemical test. Defendant 
attempted to invoke a right he did not have. 
Utah's Implied Consent Law has not changed substantively since its 
initial passage and the version of the code in force on the date of violation 
was as follows: "A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is 
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considered to have given the person's consent to a chemical test." Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(l)(a)(2004). See also Moran v. Shaw, 580 P.2d 
241, 243 (Utah 1978) (holding to drive is a privilege, not a right, so when a 
person obtains a driver's license he is deemed to consent to the chemical test 
in exchange for his privilege to drive). 
Subsection 10(7) of the Implied Consent Law is clear that defendant 
does not have a right to counsel: "For the purpose of determining whether to 
submit to a chemical test or tests, the person to be tested does not have the 
right to consult an attorney or have an attorney, physician or any other 
person present as a condition for taking of any test." Utah Code Ann. §41-
6-44.10(7)(2004). 
Utah case law clearly emphasizes the absolute nature of Utah Ann. § 
41-6-44.10(7)(2004): a defendant does not have the ability to impose a right 
to counsel or any conditions on the chemical test. "The statute plainly and 
simply requires that such an accused [motorist who is arrested by officer 
who has reason to believe motorist is driving in an intoxicated condition] 
give his consent; and it does not give him the privilege of imposing any 
conditions as a prerequisite thereto." Moran v. Shaw, 580 P.2d 241, 243 
(Utah 1978). 
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Further, Utah case law has made the distinction between one's 
Miranda rights and one's right to refuse a chemical test in Holman v. Cox, 
598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979). While an arrested driver has a constitutionally 
protected right to refuse to give statements to police, he does not have a 
constitutionally protected right to refuse to submit to a chemical test or a 
constitutionally protected right to counsel to help him decide whether to take 
the chemical test. "While an arrested driver has the right to refuse to give 
statements to a police officer, Miranda v. Arizona, [citation omitted], he 
does not have the right to refuse a blood test be made. Cf. Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) [parallel cites omitted]." Holman 598 P.2d 
at 1334. 
In addition to its opinion in Holman, the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed the lack of the right to counsel in Utah's Implied Consent Law in 
Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah 1979). "[A] person does not have a 
right to refuse to submit to a chemical test only the physical power; 
therefore, as in Schmerber, there is no issue of counsel's ability to assist 
respondent in respect of any rights he did possess." Cavaness, 598 P.2d at 
353. The Court held that "respondent was not entitled to the assistance of 
counsel in deciding whether or not to submit to the breathalyzer test. 
[Citations omitted.]" Id. (Holding that the provision in the Utah Implied 
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Consent Law denying defendant counsel did not deprive defendant of his 
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment). 
In Miranda, Edwards and their progeny defendants were invoking 
constitutional rights that they did in fact possess. In the instant case, 
defendant told Officer Falkner that he wanted an attorney before he decided 
whether to take the breath test.' Defendant's request for counsel is invoking a 
right that the defendant does not have. Per statute and case law, defendants 
do not have a right to counsel when deciding whether to submit to the breath 
test. Defendant has no constitutional right to confer with an attorney before 
taking or refusing the breath test. 
D. OFFICER FALKNER MADE IT CLEAR TO DEFENDANT, 
AS UTAH CASE LAW REQUIRES, THAT DEFENDANT 
HAD NO RIGHT TO INVOKE COUNSEL FOR THE 
BREATH TEST. 
Utah case law requires that officers explain to an arrested motorist 
that under the Implied Consent Law the motorist can lose his driver's 
license if he does not take the chemical test. "The officer is responsible for 
making this clear to the arrested motorist, and this duty must be discharged 
in a fashion that will clearly alert the driver to the consequences of a refusal 
whether expressed verbally or implied from his conduct and words." 
Holman, 598 P.2d at 1334. 
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If a motorist appears confused regarding his duties under the Implied 
Consent Law and his rights under Miranda, the officer must try to dispel that 
confusion. 
If a drivers response indicates that he is refusing or postponing 
the chemical test under the mistaken impression that he is 
merely asserting a legal right that he thinks he may have under 
Miranda, it is incumbent on the arresting officer to explain 
unequivocally to the motorist that the Miranda rights to remain 
silent and to consult an attorney do not apply to the decision to 
take a chemical test." 
Hodman, 598 P.2d at 1333-1334 (Emphasis added). 
As the evidence clearly showed at the suppression hearing, Officer 
Falkner explained clearly to defendant that his Miranda rights to consult an 
attorney did not apply to the decision to take the breath test. (See R. 37). 
The testimony at trial makes it even clearer that Officer Falkner 
property explained the difference between defendant's rights and 
responsibilities under Miranda and the Implied Consent Law. Defendant 
told Officer Falkner that "Well, I think I want my lawyer here before I take 
this test." (R. 138:39). I want to call an attorney to see if I should take this 
test or not." (R. 138:54). " Officer Falkner then read defendant the pre-
printed admonition on his DUI report regarding right to counsel and the 
chemical test to defendant. 
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not 
apply to the implied - sorry, implied consent law, which is civil 
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in nature and separate from your criminal charges. Your right 
to remain silent does not give you the right to refuse to take the 
test. You do not have the right to have counsel during the test 
procedure. Unless you submit to the test I'm requesting, I'll 
consider that you have refused to take the test. I'll warn you if 
you refuse to take the test your driver's license can be revoked 
for one year with no provision for a limited license. 
(R. 138:40-41). 
It is important to note that Officer Falkner's testimony regarding what 
was said surrounding the breath test is undisputed testimony: defendant 
never testified that Officer Falkner's recollections regarding the statements 
both parties made regarding defendant's request for an attorney were 
inaccurate. Therefore, it is clear that Officer Falkner clearly explained to 
defendant his rights and responsibilities under the Implied Consent Law and 
Miranda. 
E. IF THIS COURT FINDS DEFENDANT INVOKED HIS 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL, THEN DEFENDANT 
AMBIGUOUSLY INVOKED THAT RIGHT, OFFICER 
FALKNER PROPERLY CLARIFIED DEFENDANT'S 
AMBIGUOUS STATEMENTS, AND DEFENDANT 
KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVED HIS 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
If this Court finds that defendant was invoking his right to counsel 
under Miranda, Edwards, and their progeny, then this request was 
ambiguous in light of the circumstances of the breath test discussion. Then, 
Officer Falkner properly clarified defendant's ambiguous invocation and 
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defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to have counsel 
present during questioning and waived his right to remain silent. 
A defendant makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous if "a 
reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only 
that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel." Davis v. U.S., 512 
U.S.452, 459 (1994) (Emphasis added). It was not clear to Officer Falkner 
that defendant was invoking his right to counsel because "the light of the 
circumstances" or context of the invocation was a discussion of the breath 
test. IdL The suppression hearing record reflects that defendant "requested 
council [sic] before taking the test." (R. 37). 
The trial record also shows that it was not clear that defendant was 
invoking his right to counsel. All of defendant's questions and statements 
regarding an attorney were in the context of the breath test. "I think I want 
my lawyer here before I take this test." (R. 138:39). Defendant insisted that 
he was not refusing the test but he wanted his attorney with him before he 
took the test. (R. 138:41). 
When a defendant makes an ambiguous or equivocal request for an 
attorney, further questioning is limited to "clarifying the request." State v. 
Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). All of Officer 
Falknerfs statements were limited to the topic of the breath test, the Implied 
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Consent Law and defendant's Miranda rights. Thus Officer Falkner was 
"clarifying the request". Id. at 947. Officer Falkner repeatedly explained 
defendant's rights and responsibilities under the Implied Consent Law. 
Eventually Officer Falkner marked defendant as a refusal and gave 
defendant his Miranda rights which clearly indicated that he had a right to 
talk to an attorney and have the attorney present with him while he was 
being questioned. (R. 138:42). Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. This explanation, 
in addition to the prior explanations, makes clear to the defendant that he 
had a right to an attorney before answering questions in contrast to his lack 
of a right to have an attorney before taking the breath test. Defendant 
indicated that he understood his rights and he agreed to talk to Officer 
Falkner. (R. 138:42). 
At one point during the breath test discussion defendant asked Officer 
Falkner "Do I need a lawyer?". Officer Falkner properly responded "Well, 
that's up to you. It's not up to me, it's up to you." (R: 138:39). Similarly 
the Utah Supreme Court held that when a defendant responded "I don't 
know" to the officer's recitation of his Miranda rights, it was proper for the 
officer to respond ,f[y]ou don't have to answer questions if you don't want to. 
It's up to you". State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 1997). The 
defendant then nodded. Id. The Utah Supreme Court held that considering 
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the totality of the circumstances the officer's efforts in Leyva to clarify 
defendant's statement were sufficient. The Court found that defendant's 
waiver of rights was done knowingly and intelligently. Id. 
Defendant's request for an attorney was not a clear invocation of 
counsel so that a reasonable officer would understand that defendant was 
invoking his right to counsel. In the context of the breath test discussion, it 
was reasonable for Officer Falkner to think that defendant was asking for an 
attorney to help him decide whether to take the breath test. Officer Falkner 
clarified defendant's ambiguous request by explaining the Implied Consent 
Law for which there is no right to counsel and providing defendant's 
Miranda rights which clearly do allow counsel before defendant is 
questioned. Therefore, defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his 
right to have counsel present during questioning and waived his right to 
remain silent. 
IL IF THIS COURT RULES THAT THERE WAS AN EVIDENTIARY 
ERROR AND DEFENDANT'S POST-MIRANDA STATEMENTS 
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AT TRIAL, THERE 
WAS NO PREJUDICE. 
The admission of defendant's post-Miranda statements given to 
Officer Falkner on the night of the violation were harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt and thus not prejudicial to defendant. State v. Kiriluk, 975 
P.2d 469 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). " The standard is not whether one "might 
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imagine a single juror whose decision hinged on [defendant's] confession. 
Rather 'we look to what seems to us to have been the probable impact of the 
confession on the minds of the average juror."1 Id at 472, citing State v. 
Villarreal 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 1995)(quoting Harrington v. California, 
395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969)). The probable impact of defendant's post-
Miranda statements is that they supported defendant's claim that he was 
impaired by alcohol so that he was unable to drive safely. Kiriluk provides 
several factors to consider to determine the "probable impact" of the post-
Miranda statements on the jury which include: importance of statements to 
prosecution's case, whether the statements are cumulative, and the overall 
strength of the prosecution's case. Id. 
Defendant states the City must show that the "remaining evidence 
[without post-Miranda statements] presented at trial must be so weighty that 
it assures the conviction". (See Appellant brief 18.) This standard is not 
supported by case law. Also, although defendant characterizes the 
defendants post-Miranda statements as a "confession", defendant never 
confessed to driving under the influence. Rather, as a discussion of the 
record below shows, defendant's statements post-Miranda were limited and 
mitigated defendant's pre-arrest statements. 
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The defendant's statements post-Miranda were limited and not 
important to the City's case as his statements mitigated defendant's pre-arrest 
statement to Officer Falkner that defendant had drunk a "six pack". (R. 
138:20). See State v. Kiriluk, 975 P.2d at 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) 
(holding that the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's 
case is a factor to consider when determining whether an error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt). Defendant's more detailed description 
regarding the amount of alcohol he had drunk was "two bottles and two 
cans". (R. 138:43). This response also supported defendant's theory of the 
case which was although defendant had been drinking alcohol, he was not 
impaired by alcohol so that he was unable to safely drive a vehicle. Further, 
his post-Miranda time table regarding drinking put his last beer at 11:30 p.m. 
(R. 138:43). That information also helps defendant's theory of the case since 
the accident occurred after one in the morning, an hour and one-half later. 
In addition to not being important to the City's case, defendant's post-
Miranda statements were cumulative because he repeated them on direct-
examination. (R. 138: 118.) Kiriluk, 975 P.2d at 473 (holding that whether 
the testimony was cumulative is a factor to consider when determining 
whether an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 
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The City had a strong case based on the testimony of a third party 
witness, Ms. Ana Crowe, and an experienced DUI investigator Officer 
Falkner. Further, physical evidence supported Ms. Crowe's testimony. 
Finally, the City had defendant's pre-arrest statements that he thought the 
light was green and that he had drunk six beers. Kiriluk, 975 P.2d at 473 
(holding "the overall strength of the prosecution's case" is a factor when 
determining whether error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 
Ms. Ana Crowe, a third party witness, was driving behind the sedan 
on 600 South going east. She was approximately 20 feet behind the sedan as 
they approached their green light at West Temple. The light had been green 
for Ms. Crowe and the sedan thirty or forty-five seconds as it had turned 
green when the sedan was one-half a block prior to it on 600 South. (R. 
138:14 and 15, 158). As the sedan entered the intersection, Ms. Crowe saw 
defendant run his red light going southbound on West Temple approaching 
600 South. Defendant drove "very fast" through the light at West Temple 
and 600 South and "T-boned" the sedan. (R. 138:14-15). Defendant did not 
swerve or slow. Ms. Crowe stayed with the injured driver of the sedan until 
police and ambulance arrived. (R. 138:16). Ms. Crowe's testimony was 
disinterested and compelling. 
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Two eyewitnesses at the scene told Officer Falkner that defendant ran 
the light (R. 138:21). 
Ms. Crowe's testimony disputed defendant's testimony that his light 
was green when he was 30 to 40 feet from his intersection and that he was 
traveling 35 miles per hour. (R. 138:136). At approximately 10 to 15 feet 
away from the intersection defendant testified he was looking in his rearview 
mirror to see if he had hit an animal that he saw in the road. Although, he 
"was not really sure" regarding the time he estimated that three to four 
seconds before impact he was looking forward and he saw his light was 
green. (R. 138:138). He testified that he did swerve a little bit to the left 
prior to contact. (R. 138:139). 
Defendant's explanation for the crash was that he was looking into his 
rearview mirror for an animal that he may have run over. (138:119). When 
Officer Falkner asked defendant pre-arrest if his green was a red light or 
green light, defendant responded "I'm not sure. As far as I know it was 
green." (R. 138:21). Officer Falkner testified alcohol impairs judgment. 
(R. 138:151). The jury could have concluded that defendant's perception of 
the color of his light was impaired by the effects of alcohol and his light was 
in fact red. The jury could have gone on to conclude that if defendant was 
under the influence of alcohol to the degree that he could not tell if his light 
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was green or red, then this inability rendered him incapable of safely 
driving. 
As Officer Falkner approached defendant, at approximately five feet 
away, he could smell alcohol on defendant. Officer Falkner could also smell 
alcohol on defendant's breath. (R. 138:19). Officer Falkner saw that 
defendant had watery, red bloodshot eyes. Officer Falkner also heard 
defendant's slurred speech. (R. 138:20). 
At trial defendant claimed he banged his head on the driver's side door 
frame. (R. 138:120). Although he told Officer Falkner about a 1997 ankle 
injury and told another officer about once having tuberculosis, he never told 
anyone, including the EMT who checked him for his injuries, that his head 
hurt. (R. 138:121, 133-134). 
Defendant testified that he had a 1997 ankle injury, seven years before 
the crash. Defendant never testified that the ankle injury caused him to do 
poorly on the nine step walk and turn or the one legged stand. Defendant 
did testify that at the time of the crash he worked at a laboratory where he 
spent eight hours a day on his feet. (R. 138:142). 
Defendant's witness, Dr. Rothefeder, testified that a closed head injury 
or a concussion could cause HGN. (R. 138:93). Defendant spoke to Dr. 
Rothefeder for the first time after Dr. Rothefeder's testimony and before 
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defendant's testimony. (R. 138:144-145). After speaking with Dr. 
Rothefeder for the first time during trial and hearing Dr. Rothefeder's 
testimony regarding HGN, defendant testified that he had a closed head 
injury and that he hit his head on the driver's side door frame when he 
crashed into the sedan. (R. 138:145; 120). The jury could have concluded 
that the testimony regarding defendant banging his head and his closed head 
injury was self-serving testimony to undermine Officer Falkner's HGN 
testimony. The jury could also have concluded that the ankle injury did not 
affect defendant's performance on the field sobriety tests. Such conclusions 
would have further undermined defendant's credibility with the jury. 
The jurors assessed the credibility of the witnesses: defendant, 
Officer Falkner, Ms. Crowe and the Dr. Rothefeder. Then the jurors 
determined the facts. The post-Miranda statements were not important to 
assessing credibility or determining facts. 
The admission of defendant's post-Miranda statements was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt and thus not prejudicial to defendant. The 
defendant's statements post-Miranda were limited and supported defendant's 
explanation of events. The City had a strong case with the testimony Ms. 
Crowe and Officer Falkner and defendant's pre-arrest statements. Finally, 
defendant's post-Miranda statements were cumulative as he testified to the 
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same information during his direct examination. Looking at the impact of 
the post-Miranda statements on the jury it is clear the statements were 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and not prejudicial to defendant. 
CONCLUSION AND SPECIFIC RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the foregoing points, authorities and arguments, the City 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress. 
Respectfully submitted this / 3 day of July, 2006. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORP, 
lerman 
Attorne}^fbrAppellee 
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TITLE 4 1 . MOTOR VEHICLES 
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 
ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING 
Utah Code Ann. § 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0 (2004) 
§ 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0 . Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug — Number of tests — 
Refusal — Warning, report — Hearing, revocation of license -- Appeal -- Person incapable of 
refusal -- Results of test available — Who may give test — Evidence 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have given the 
person's consent to a chemical test or tests of the person's breath, blood, urine, or oral fluids 
for the purpose of determining whether the person was operating or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under 
Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable 
controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation 
of Section 41-6-44.6, if the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace officer 
having grounds to believe that person to have been operating or in actual physical control of 
a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under 
Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable 
controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation 
of Section 41-6-44.6. 
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered and how many of 
them are administered. 
(n) If a peace officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to take one or 
more requested tests, even though the person does submit to any other requested test or 
tests, is a refusal under this section. 
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a chemical test or 
tests of the person's breath, blood, or urine, or oral fluids may not select the test or tests to 
be administered 
(n) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any specific chemical test is 
not a defense to taking a test requested by a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any 
criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the 
requested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested by a peace 
officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under Subsection (1), and refuses 
to submit to any chemical test requested, the person shall be warned by the peace officer 
requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in 
revocation of the person's license to operate a motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if the person does not immediately 
request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be administered, a peace 
officer shall, on behalf of the Driver License Division and within 24 hours of the arrest, give 
notice of the Driver License Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to 
operate a motor vehicle. When a peace officer gives the notice on behalf of the Driver License 
Division, the peace officer shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator; 
(n) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days from the date of 
arrest; and 
(in) supply to the operator, in a manner specified by the Driver License Division, basic 
information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the Driver License Division 
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if provided in a manner specified by the Driver 
License Division, also serve as the temporary license certificate. 
(d) As a matter of procedure, the peace officer shall submit a signed report, within ten 
calendar days after the day on which notice is provided under Subsection (2)(b), that the 
peace officer had grounds to believe the arrested person had been operating or was in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while 
having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the 
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, and that the person had refused to submit to 
a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1). 
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's intention to revoke 
the person's license under this section is entitled to a hearing. 
(n) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten calendar days after the 
day on which notice is provided. 
(in) Upon request in a manner specified by the Driver License Division, the Driver License 
Division shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of 
arrest. 
(iv) If the person does not make a request for a hearing before the Driver License 
Division under this Subsection (2)(e), the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the 
state is revoked beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest for a period of. 
(A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(e)( iv)(B) applies; or 
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous: 
(I) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from 
the date of arrest under this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; 
or 
( I I ) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the 
date of arrest under Section 41-6-44. 
(f) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(f)(u), if a hearing is requested by the person, 
the hearing shall be conducted by the Driver License Division in the county in which the 
offense occurred. 
(u) The Driver License Division may hold a hearing in some other county if the Driver 
License Division and the person both agree. 
(g) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a person was 
operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44, 41-6-44.6, or 53-3-231; and 
(n) whether the person refused to submit to the test. 
(h) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses 
and the production of relevant books and papers; and 
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers. 
(n) The Driver License Division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the 
Transportation Fund in accordance with the rates established in Section 78-46-28 
(i) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the person was requested 
to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if the 
person fails to appear before the Driver License Division as required in the notice, the Driver 
License Division shall revoke the person's license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah 
beginning on the date the hearing is held for a period of-
(i) (A) 18 months unless Subsection ( 2 ) ( I ) ( I ) ( B ) applies; or 
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous: 
(I) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from 
the date of arrest under this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232; 
or 
( I I ) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the 
date of arrest under Section 41-6-44 
(n) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee 
imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(13), a fee under Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid 
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs. 
(HI) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court decision 
following a proceeding allowed under this Subsection (2) that the revocation was improper. 
(j) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License Division under this 
section may seek judicial review. 
( I I ) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial Venue is in the district 
court in the county in which the offense occurred. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering the person 
incapable ol refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to not have 
withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the test or tests may be 
administered whether the person has been arrested or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or tests shall be 
made available to the person. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under 
Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to determine 
the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation does not apply to taking a urine, breath, or oral 
fluid specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Section 
26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws a sample of blood from any person 
whom a peace officer has reason to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital 
or medical facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal liability 
arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered according to standard medical 
practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at the person's own expense, have a physician of the 
person's own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests administered at 
the direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect admissibility of the 
results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, or preclude or delay the 
test or tests to be taken at the direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at the direction 
of a peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or tests, the person 
to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or have an attorney, physician, or 
other person present as a condition for the taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or any additional 
test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in any civil or criminal action or 
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was 
operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, 
any drug, combination of alcohol and any drug, or while having any measurable controlled 
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0 , enacted by L. 1981, ch. 126, § 43; 1983, ch. 99, § 16; 
1987, ch. 129, § 3; 1987, ch. 138, § 4 1 ; 1987, ch. 161, § 143; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, §§ 3, 
4; 1988, ch. 148, § 1; 1990, ch. 30, § 21 ; 1992, ch. 78, § 3; 1993, ch. 161, § 2; 1993, ch. 
193, § 2; 1993, ch. 205, § 3; 1993, ch. 234, § 35; 1994, ch. 180, § 3; 1996, ch. 71 , § 3; 
1997, ch. 10, § 61 ; 1998, ch. 213, § 1; 1999, ch. 226, § 3; 2000, ch. 89, § 1; 2000, ch. 
334, § 4; 2001, ch. 46, § 14; 2002, ch. 185, § 29; 2004, ch. 161, § 2; 2004, ch. 205, § 3. 
NOTES: 
REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. -Laws 1981, ch. 126, § 43 repealed former § 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0 
as last amended by L. 1977, ch. 268, § 4, relating to implied consent to tests, and enacted 
present § 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0 . 
AMENDMENT NOTES. - T h e 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, inserted "or while 
having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the 
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6" twice in Subsection ( l ) (a ) and once in 
Subsection (2)(d); substituted "Section 41-6-44.4, 41-6-44.6, or 53-3-223" for "Section 4 1 -
2-130 or 41-6-44.4" in Subsection (2)(e)( iv)(B); inserted "41-6-44.4, or 44-6-44 6" in 
Subsection (2)( f ) ( i ) ; substituted "53-3-223" for "41-2-130 or" and inserted "or 41-6-44.6" in 
Subsection (2)(h) ( i)(B); and added "or while having any measurable controlled substance or 
metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body" at the end of Subsection (8) 
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, substituted "53-3-231" for "41-6 44 4" 
throughout the section. 
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, updated the second reference in Subsection 
(2)( f)( i ) . 
The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998, updated section references in Subsections 
( l ) ( a ) , (2)(d), (2)(e)(.v)(B) and (2)(h)(.)(B). 
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, in Subsection (2)(d) added "As a matter of 
procedure" at the beginning and substituted "ten days" for "five days"; divided Subsection 
(2)(f) into Subsections (2)(f) and (g), substituting "the hearing shall be conducted" for "and 
conducted" and adding the venue provisions in Subsection (2)(f) , and redesignated the 
subsequent subsections accordingly; substituted "offense occurred" for "person resides" in 
Subsection (2)( j ) (2) ; and made stylistic changes. 
The 2000 amendment by ch. 89, effective May 1, 2000, increased the time periods in 
Subsections (2)(e)( iv)(A), (2)(e)( iv)(B), ( 2 ) ( I ) ( I ) ( A ) , and ( 2 ) ( I ) ( I ) ( B ) by six months; and 
made stylistic changes. 
The 2000 amendment by ch. 334, effective May 1, 2000, added "calendar" before "days" in 
Subsections (2)(d) and (2)(e)(n). 
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted "Section 78-46-28" for "Section 
21-5-4" in Subsection (2)(h)(n). 
The 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002, updated a statutory reference in Subsection 
(2)(i)(n). 
The 2004 amendment by ch. 161, effective May 3, 2004, substituted "within 24 hours of 
the arrest" for "immediate" and "give" for "serve on the person" in Subsection (2)(b); 
substituted "day on which notice is provided" for "date of the arrest" in Subsections (2)(d) 
and (e); deleted "written" before "request" twice in Subsection (2)(e); throughout the 
section, added "peace" before "officer" and substituted "for an offense that occurred within 
the previous ten years from the date of arrest" for "after July 1, 1993"; and made stylistic 
changes. 
The 2004 amendment by ch. 205, effective May 3, 2004, inserted "or oral fluids" in 
Subsections ( l ) ( a ) , ( l ) ( c ) , and (5)(a). 
This section has been reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
